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1 Introduction
Declining fertility, increasing longevity, and the aging of the baby-boom generation will all con-
tribute to substantial increases of the old-age dependency ratio, especially in Western countries.
Most of the increase in the old-age dependency ratio is expected to take place between now and
2050. This has raised concern about the sustainability of existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public
pension schemes (see for instance Gruber and Wise, 2004, 2005) and has motivated pension
reform plans.
It is now well understood that a correct appraisal of population aging and pension reform effects
calls for a general equilibrium approach. OLG models such as those developed by Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) (deterministic setting) and Ríos-Rull (1996) (stochastic set-up) provide a
useful analytical framework to obtain quantitative evaluations (see for instance Börsch-Supan et
al., 2002, 2006, and the series of papers presented at the Carnegie-Rochester Conference, 2007).
All these studies point out that population aging will make labor relatively scarcer and change
equilibrium factor prices. Wages are expected to rise and interest rates to fall. Because aging is
a worldwide but unsynchronized phenomenon, savings rates are expected to evolve differently in
different countries, leading to significant international capital flows. Börsch-Supan et al. (2006)
and Attanasio et al. (2007) both emphasized that a proper evaluation of the impact of aging
on equilibrium prices and quantities calls for a multi-country approach. However, Attanasio et
al. (2007) suggested that accounting for international capital flows might have little impact on
the fiscal variables themselves, because of the counteracting effects of interest and wage rate
changes (for instance, lower capital tax revenues compensated for by higher labor tax revenues
following an increase in payroll or consumption taxes).
Most existing models rely though on quite streamlined representations of the labor market and
assume perfect competition. The focus is on individual hours of work rather than employment.
In this context, considering endogenous rather than exogenous labor supply decisions barely
changes the estimated quantitative impact of population aging (see for instance Attanasio et
al., 2007, Krueger and Ludwig, 2007). As noted by Lucas (2007), neglecting labor adjustments
along the extensive margin may be quite misleading. Such adjustments can play a significant
role, especially in countries (like many European ones) where labor market imperfections and
institutions can have a strong, age-specific impact on job creation and destruction.
The aim of this paper is to allow for such effects and evaluate their quantitative contribution
to the macroeconomic effects of population aging. To that end, we combine two strands of
research, life-cycle and search/matching models. Labor market imperfections are modelled as
in Pissarides (2000), with matching and wage bargaining. To concentrate on the extensive
margin effects, we shut off the intensive margin channels by assuming that each worker supplies
inelastically one unit of labor. Changes in total hours of work are solely due to changes in the
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number of employed workers1. We furthermore allow for early-retirement effects.
It is well documented that participation rates vary over the life-cycle. Participation rates of
middle-aged workers (25-55) are high and similar in both the US and the EU. The participation
rates of older (>55) workers are however lower in the EU. The literature stresses that differences
in older participation rates reflect cross-country differences in labor market frictions and in the
generosity of early-retirement provisions. Several empirical studies have shown that financial
incentives do have a significant impact on early-retirement decisions (see for instance Gruber
and Wise, 1999 or Duval, 2003, and the references therein). Although the official retirement age
is exogenous in most countries, the actual average retirement age is endogenous and contributes
to explaining the lower employment rate of older workers. Like Heijdra and Romp (2007), we
thus distinguish the normal (compulsory) retirement age (65 years) and the early eligibility age
(55). Workers may choose to retire between 55 and 65, and receive then an early-retirement
compensation. Like Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), we consider a stylized two-tier pension system,
so that after 65 the revenue of pensioners is made up of two components, a public PAYG pension
and a private pre-funded pension (the revenue from accumulated savings).
A few studies have already examined some of the consequences of introducing life-cycle fea-
tures into frictional labor markets; none of them has however evaluated the effects of future
demographic trends. Hairault et al. (2010) examined early-retirement decisions and job search
intensities in a search model à la McCall (1970), with exogenous wage distribution extended to
include stochastic aging. The emphasis is on the relationship between the time to the retire-
ment age and the financial incentives to invest in search activities. Chéron et al. (2008, 2011)
developed this modelling strategy further. They introduced a matching process similar to that
used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) adapted to include finite lifetimes. They showed that
in some circumstances (in particular at fixed, age-independent worker productivity) the job de-
struction rate is higher for older workers, because the time horizon relevant for the employment
decision decreases with age. In these models, there is no post-retirement consumption and no
savings; the interest rate is exogenous.
Our model has three main building blocks (i) demographics; (ii) labor market frictions and
institutions (including early-retirement provisions); (iii) life-cycle consumption and savings.
Ríos-Rull (2001) emphasized the importance of a careful description of the demographic process,
which can vary a lot from country to country. To fit actual data, we use French mortality,
fertility and migration rates, so that the size of each cohort in every period coincides with the
most recent demographic projections. We assume no aggregate uncertainty. In line with most
of the literature, we also assume perfect risk sharing across individuals of a given generation,
1Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) distinguish labor supply adjustments along both the extensive and the
intensive margins and discuss the connections/interactions between pension reforms and labor market reforms.
Changes along the extensive margin however remain exogenous to the model.
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so that individuals are perfectly insured against life and income uncertainty.2 There are no
intended bequests. All workers are perfect substitutes, although the worker’s productivity is
age-dependent. There is no age discrimination, so that firms posting a vacancy may end up
hiring a worker of any age category. We examine in this setup the effects of population aging
and pension reforms on equilibrium unemployment and activity rates, and on the cost of public
PAYG pensions as a percentage of GDP. In order to focus on labor market imperfections and
their consequences, we do not at this stage build a multi-country model. We consider a single
country, and illustrate the potential impact of international capital flows by comparing two
polar cases, the closed and the small open economy case.
We use numerical simulations to examine the properties of our model and the consequences
of aging and pension reforms. The most important feature brought about by labor market
frictions is the connection between the interest rate and the unemployment rate. Exogenous
shocks (like aging or pension reforms) leading to lower interest rates also imply lower equi-
librium unemployment rates. This is because lower capital costs stimulate labor demand and
induce firms to post more vacancies. The consequence is a higher employment rate and higher
bargained wages. When participation of older workers is endogenous, these employment effects
are reinforced by the increased participation rate of older workers, induced both by the higher
wage rate and the larger probability of finding a job. It is shown in that context that neglecting
labor market frictions and employment rate changes may lead to the underestimation of pension
reform effects when they affect the equilibrium interest rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. The
calibration is detailed in Section 3. Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section
4. in Section 5 we present our conclusions.
2 The Model
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and frictions on
the labor market. Frictions are modelled following Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides (DMP),
with (exogenous) job destruction and a matching function. We assume perfect substitutability
between all workers, although labor productivity is age-dependent. Perfect substitutability
means that there is a single matching function (all vacancies can be filled by any worker,
whatever his or her age). Age-directed search is not a credible strategy in our setup. Because
the value of an unfilled vacancy is zero at equilibrium (free entry condition), a firm which
wanted to target at, say, young workers, would eventually hire the first worker who applied,
2There are a few exceptions. Krueger and Ludwig (2007) and Hairault and Langot (2008), for instance,
investigated the consequences of policy reforms (increased taxes or lower benefits) on inequality when financial
markets are incomplete and individuals face idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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provided the surplus to be shared was positive. Bargained wages will reflect differences in work
efficiency.
2.1 Demographics
We do not model education and human capital accumulation and focus on the behavior of
people between 25 and 104 (the maximum life duration). One period of time lasts five years.
This periodicity seems a good compromise between the traditional two-period model which
would be less suitable for calibration, and an annual model which would give no additional
insight given our purpose to model demographic transitions and public finance dynamics rather
than business cycles.
Each member of a given generation can live for up to sixteen five-year periods (from age 25 till
104), indexed from 0 to 15. Let 푍푎,푡 denote the size of the generation reaching age 푎 at period
t. The size of new generations changes over time at an exogenous rate 푥푡:
푍0,푡 = (1 + 푥푡)푍0,푡−1, ∀푡 > 0, (1)
where 푥푡 includes both fertility and migration shocks at age zero. As in de la Croix et al.
(2007), we assume that migrants of each generation have the same characteristics as natives.
Abstracting from later migration shocks, the size of a given generation 푡 declines determin-
istically through time. This size is determined by a cumulative survival probability 훽푎,푡+푎 so
that:
푍푎,푡+푎 = 훽푎,푡+푎 푍0,푡 +푋푎,푡+푎, ∀푎 ∈ {1, 2, ...15}, (2)
where 0 ≤ 훽푎,푡+푎 ≤ 1 is decreasing in 푎, with 훽0,푡 = 1. Migration flows after age 25 are taken
into account through 푋푎,푡+푎. Total (adult) population at time 푡 is equal to 푍푡 =
∑15
푎=0 푍푎,푡.
The demographic growth and survival probability vector can vary over time. These changes
are assumed to be exogenous.
We use the dummy variable 푧푎,푡+푎 to define the population of working age:
푃푎,푡+푎 = 푧푎,푡+푎 푍푎,푡+푎, (3)
where 푧푎,푡+푎 = 1 for 0 ≤ 푎 ≤ 7, 푧푎,푡+푎 = 0 otherwise. We assume a mandatory retirement
age of 65, so that all people above 64 (8 ≤ 푎 ≤ 15) are inactive. We further assume that the
participation rate between 25 and 54 is exogenous and normalized to unity. Between 55 and 64,
workers can choose to take early-retirement. People of working age are thus either employed
(푁), unemployed (푈), or on an early-retirement scheme (퐸). Thus:
푃푎,푡 = 푁푎,푡 + 푈푎,푡 + 퐸푎,푡 ,
=
[
푛푎,푡 + 푢푎,푡 + 푒푎,푡
]
푃푎,푡 , 0 ≤ 푎 ≤ 7
⇔ 1 = 푛푎,푡 + 푢푎,푡 + 푒푎,푡 , (4)
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where lower-case 푛, 푢 and 푒 denote the proportion of individuals in each state. The early-
retirement rate before 55 is zero (푒푎,푡 = 0 for 푎 < 6). Let 휆6,푡 denote the fraction of people who
choose to retire early and leave the labor market at age 푎 = 6 (between 55 and 60), so that the
number of early retired workers of that age group is 퐸6,푡 = 휆6,푡 푃6,푡. Similarly, let 휆7,푡 denote
the fraction of active workers who decide to leave the labor market at age 푎 = 7 (between 60
and 64). The total number of workers on early-retirement at time 푡 is then equal to:
퐸6,푡 + 퐸7,푡 = 푒6,푡 푃6,푡 + 푒7,푡 푃7,푡 ,
with 푒6,푡 = 휆6,푡 , (5)
푒7,푡 = 휆6,푡−1 + 휆7,푡 (1− 휆6,푡−1) .
2.2 Labor Market Flows
We assume a constant returns to scale matching function:
푀푡 = 푀(푉푡,Ω푡) (6)
where 푉푡 and Ω푡 stand respectively for the total number of vacancies and job seekers at the
beginning of period 푡. Ω푡 is the sum across all age categories:
Ω푡 =
7∑
푎=0
Ω푎,푡 ,
= 푃0,푡 +
5∑
푎=1
[1− (1− 휒)푛푎−1,푡−1]푃푎,푡
+ [1− (1− 휒)푛5,푡−1] (1− 휆6,푡)푃6,푡
+ [(1− 휆6,푡−1)− (1− 휒)푛6,푡−1] (1− 휆7,푡)푃7,푡.
(7)
At the beginning of period 푡, all new entrants 푃0,푡 are job seekers. Except for early-retirement
decisions, job separations are determined by an exogenous job destruction rate 휒. Parameters
휆6,푡 and 휆7,푡 introduce the effects of early-retirement.
The probabilities of finding a job and of filling a vacancy are defined as follows:
푝푡 =
푀푡
Ω푡
and 푞푡 =
푀푡
푉푡
. (8)
The number of employed workers in age group 푎 is determined by the sum of non-destroyed
jobs (when 푎 > 0) and new hires:
푛푎,푡 = 푝푡
Ω푎,푡
푃푎,푡
for 푎 = 0 ;
= (1− 휒)푛푎−1,푡−1 + 푝푡 Ω푎,푡
푃푎,푡
for 1 ≤ 푎 ≤ 5 ;
= (1− 휆푎,푡) (1− 휒)푛푎−1,푡−1 + 푝푡 Ω푎,푡
푃푎,푡
for 6 ≤ 푎 ≤ 7 .
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After substituting for Ω푎,푡, this equation becomes:
푛푎,푡 = 푝푡 , for 푎 = 0 ;
= (1− 푝푡)(1− 휒)푛푎−1,푡−1 + 푝푡 for 1 ≤ 푎 ≤ 5 ;
= (1− 푝푡)(1− 휆푎,푡) (1− 휒)푛푎−1,푡−1 + 푝푡(1− 휆푎,푡) for 푎 = 6 ;
= (1− 푝푡)(1− 휆푎,푡) (1− 휒)푛푎−1,푡−1 + 푝푡(1− 휆푎,푡)(1− 휆푎−1,푡−1) for 푎 = 7 .
(9)
The same equation can be written in terms of the probability of filling a vacancy 푞푡 by using
푝푡 = 푞푡 푉푡/Ω푡. Total employment will then be equal to:
푁푡 =
7∑
푎=0
푁푎,푡 , with 푁푎,푡 = 푛푎,푡 푃푎,푡 .
2.3 Households
It is assumed that each individual belongs to a representative household, one for each age
category. There is no aggregate uncertainty, and all households have perfect foresight. There
is perfect insurance against the adverse effects of individual lifetime uncertainty. There are
no intended bequests. Participation rates of workers below 55 are assumed to be exogenous
and normalized to unity. The household’s decision variables are consumption, savings and
early-retirement rates, subject to the lifetime budget constraint.
Participation Decisions and early-retirement
Participation decisions have been investigated separately in the OLG and the search/matching
literature. Various contributions in the OLG literature have focused on the determinants of
the optimal retirement age. Hu (1979) assumed that agents live for two periods. The optimal
retirement age is determined by the optimal fraction of time devoted to leisure in the second
period of life. He examined the effects of social security on capital accumulation and labor
supply in a PAYG case. The short-run effects of pensions depended on the elasticities of demand
and supply of labor; long-run effects were influenced by the elasticities of savings and bequests.
Michel and Pestieau (1999) modeled the labor participation choice in a similar fashion. The
fraction of time spent working in the second period declined when the size of the social security
payment increase. For the first-best optimum (golden rule steady state) to be decentralized as
a competitive equilibrium, both PAYG social security tax and the retirement age must be set
optimally. De la Croix, Mahieu, and Rillaers (2004) also used a two-period lifetime setup to
analyze retirement decisions. They focused on optimal dynamic adjustments following a fertility
drop and showed that the optimal adjustment of the retirement age (the fraction of the second
period devoted to leisure) depends on preference and technology parameters. Boucekkine et al.
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(2002) and Heijdra and Romp (2009) have endogenous retirement in a continuous time OLG
model with finite lifetimes and indivisible labor (participation is either 1 or 0). Heijdra and
Romp (2009) focused on the effects of demographic shocks and pension benefits on individual
early-retirement decisions. Their results suggest that only drastic reforms have a significant
impact on individual retirement decisions.
None of the previous papers takes into account labor market frictions. Most contributions
dealing with participation decisions in the search and friction literature have used models with-
out savings and capital accumulation. Recently though, Ravn (2008) has used a stochastic
growth model with infinitely lived consumers to investigate the role of endogenous participa-
tion decision on the transmission of shocks at business cycle frequencies. Labor is indivisible;
individual workers are perfectly insured against idiosyncratic consumption risk, as in the lottery
model developed by Rogerson (1988). This leads to a utility function linear in the participa-
tion rate, which implies a strong relationship between consumption and labor market tightness,
the so-called consumption-tightness puzzle. Because of the linearity of the utility function,
participation rates react too strongly to labor market tightness, which makes unemployment
procyclical. To avoid this unrealistic implication, Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009) assumed
perfect risk sharing of both consumption and leisure. All consumers are part of a representa-
tive household and share their revenues. The household decides the per capita consumption
level and the participation rate. This in effect amounts to assuming that labor is divisible,
with each individual choosing the fraction of time spent on the labor market (as employed or
unemployed). See Tripier (2003) for a similar approach.
Our model combines life-cycle features and labor market frictions. In order the avoid the
consumption-tightness puzzle, we shall rely on the Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009) speci-
fication and introduce it into our OLG structure. Without frictions, our specification would be
similar to that used by Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) (i.e. in a perfect competition setup, with
elderly workers characterized by stronger leisure preferences and choosing a smaller working
time).
Optimization Program of the Representative Household
We can write the objective function of the household (effectively one cohort) as:
푊퐻푡 = max
푐푎,푡+푎, 휆6,푡+6, 휆7,푡+7
15∑
푎=0
(
1
1 + 휃
)푎
훽푎,푡+푎
{
풰(푐푎,푡+푎)−푑푛 푛푎,푡+푎 푧푎,푡+푎+푑푒푎
(푒푎,푡+푎)
1−휙
1− 휙 푧푎,푡+푎
}
푍0,푡 ,
(10)
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where 휃 > 0 is the rate of time preference or the subjective discount rate3, 훽푎,푡+푎 is a cumulative
survival probability, 푧푎,푡+푎 is the working age dummy variable (푧푎,푡+푎 = 1 for 0 ≤ 푎 ≤ 7, 0
otherwise), and 푍0,푡 is the initial size of the cohort. Instantaneous utility is assumed to be
separable. The utility of per capita consumption 푐 is represented by a concave function 풰 (we
shall use a logarithmic function). The marginal disutility of working is assumed to be constant4
and equal to 푑푛. The extra utility derived from early-retirement is represented by a concave
function of the early-retirement rate 푒 (0 < 휙 < 1). The decision variables are 푐, 휆6 and 휆7.
These last two variables refer to the fraction of agents in the corresponding age groups who
decide to take early-retirement and leave the labor market, at ages 55 and 60 respectively.
Employment rates 푛푎,푡+푎 and early-retirement rates 푒푎,푡+푎 (and their the connection to the 휆’s)
are given by Equations (5) and (9).
The household’s flow budget constraint at time 푡+ 푎 takes the form:[
(1− 휏푤푡+푎)푤푎,푡+푎 . 푛푎,푡+푎 + 푏푢푎,푡+푎 . 푢푎,푡+푎 + 푏푒푎,푡+푎 . 푒푎,푡+푎
]
. 푧푎,푡+푎 + 푏
푖
푎,푡+푎 . (1− 푧푎,푡+푎)
+
훽푎−1,푡+푎−1
훽푎,푡+푎
푅푡+푎 푠푎−1,푡+푎−1 = (1 + 휏 푐푡+푎) 푐푎,푡+푎 + 푠푎,푡+푎
(11)
Wage and consumption tax rates are given by 휏푤 and 휏 푐 respectively; 푏푢푎,푡+푎, 푏푒푎,푡+푎, 푏푖푎,푡+푎 are the
replacement benefits received respectively by the unemployed worker, the early retiree and the
pensioner; 푠푎,푡+푎 is the financial wealth accumulated at time 푡 + 푎, in per capita terms. This
financial wealth is held in the form of either shares or physical capital. Because there is perfect
insurance against individual lifetime uncertainty (as if there were a perfect annuity market), the
total return to savings is equal to the gross risk-free interest rate 푅푡+푎 divided by the survival
probability 훽푎,푡/훽푎−1,푡−1.
The optimal consumption plan must satisfy the usual Euler equation:
푢′푐푎,푡+푎
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎
=
푅푡+푎+1
1 + 휃
푢′푐푎+1,푡+푎+1
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎+1
.
After substitution and rearrangements, the condition determining the optimal proportion of
early retirees aged 60 can be shown to be:
푏푒7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
+ 푑푒7 (푒7,푡+7)
−휙 = 휋7,푡+7
[
(1− 휏푤푡+7)푤7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
− 푑푛
]
+ (1− 휋7,푡+7)
[
푏푢7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
]
,
(12)
where 휋 is the unconditional probability of being employed (i.e., the probability that an active
worker chosen at random is actually employed). A similar condition holds for early-retirement
3As stressed by Ríos-Rull(2001), 휃 can represent both pure time preference and the effect of family size
changes (implying that consumption is enjoyed differently at different ages).
4Our formulation normalizes the disutility of search activities of the unemployed to zero. Setting 푑푛 ≥ 0
amounts to assuming that the disutility of working can be larger than that of searching.
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at age 55 (see details in the appendix A). Equation (12) says that the household’s optimal early-
retirement rate is such that the marginal utility of early-retirement (early-retirement income
plus leisure utility) is equal to the expected marginal utility of remaining active on the job
market (wage income net of labor disutility and unemployment benefit, each weighted by their
respective probability). Which member of the household will actually take early-retirement
does not depend on the initial employment status. Both employed and unemployed workers
may become early retirees. This follows from our specification of labor market flows (Equation
(9)). Assuming that only previously unemployed workers can shift to early-retirement would
be much too restrictive and unrealistic. Firms do take advantage of the generosity of early-
retirement schemes to adjust the number of their employees, while elderly workers do agree to
quit jobs earlier if the early-retirement compensation is appropriate.
For later use, we also note that the value of an additional job for a household of age 푎 is given
by:
1
푢′푐푎,푡
∂푊퐻푡
∂푁푎,푡
=
1
푢′푐푎,푡
1
푧푎,푡 푍푎,푡
∂푊퐻푡
∂푛푎,푡
=
7−푎∑
푗=0
훽푎+푗,푡+푗
훽푎,푡
(
1
1 + 휃
)푗 푢′푐푎+푗,푡+푗
푢′푐푎,푡
{
(1− 휏푤푡+푗)푤푎+푗,푡+푗 − 푏푢푎+푗,푡+푗
(1 + 휏 푐푡+푗)
− 푑
푛
푢′푐푎+푗,푡+푗
}
∂푛푎+푗,푡+푗
∂푛푎,푡
(13)
where ∂푛푎+푗,푡+푗/∂푛푎,푡 can be obtained from Equation (9).
2.4 Firms
There are two productive factors, labor and capital. Labor is measured in efficiency units.
Efficiency may vary across age (because of experience) and across generations (because of
education). We define the total labor input as follows:
퐻푡 =
7∑
푎=0
ℎ푎,푡.푁푎,푡 .
We assume a constant-return-to-scale production function in labor and capital:
푌푡 = 퐴푡 퐹 (퐾푡, 퐻푡) , (14)
where 퐴푡 stands for total factor productivity. Firms rent capital at cost 푣푡 = 푅푡+훿−1 and pay a
gross wage 푤푎,푡 to workers of age 푎. We denote by 휁 the employer wage tax. The representative
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firm maximizes the discounted value of all the dividends (profits) that will be distributed to its
shareholders. Profits at time 푡 are given by:
Π푡 = 퐹 (퐾푡, 퐻푡)− 푣푡퐾푡 −
7∑
푎=0
(1 + 휁푡)푤푎,푡푁푎,푡 − a푉푡 (15)
where “a” stands for the cost of posting a vacancy. The value of the firm can thus be written
as:5
푊 퐹푡 = max
퐾푡,푉푡
{
퐹 (퐾푡, 퐻푡)− 푣푡퐾푡 −
7∑
푎=0
(1 + 휁푡)푤푎,푡푁푎,푡 − a푉푡
}
+푅−1푡+1푊
퐹
푡+1 (16)
subject to Equation (9) and 푝푡 = 푞푡 푉푡/Ω푡. The first-order optimality conditions are
푣푡 = 퐹퐾푡 , (17)
a = 푞푡
7∑
푎=0
Ω푎,푡
Ω푡
∂푊 퐹푡
∂푁푎,푡
, (18)
where ∂푊
퐹
푡
∂푁푎,푡
is the value at time 푡 of an additional worker of age 푎. With a job destruction rate
휒, this value is equal to:
∂푊 퐹푡
∂푁푎,푡
=
1
푧푎,푡 푍푎,푡
∂푊 퐹푡
∂푛푎,푡
=
7−푎∑
푗=0
훽푎+푗,푡+푗
훽푎,푡
푅−1푡,푡+푗(1− 휆푎+푗−1,푡+푗−1) (1− 휆푎+푗,푡+푗) (1− 휒)푗
.
{
ℎ푎+푗,푡+푗 퐹퐻푡+푗 − (1 + 휁푡+푗)푤푎+푗,푡+푗
}
,
(19)
where 휆푎+푖,푡+푖 ≡ 0 for 푎+ 푖 < 6.
2.5 Government
We assume that unemployment and (early or standard) retirement benefits are determined by
an exogenous fraction of the relevant gross wage, so that
푏푢푎,푡 = 휌
푢
푡 푤푎,푡 for 0 ≤ 푎 ≤ 7 ;
푏푒푎,푡 = 휌
푒
푡 푤푎,푡 for 6 ≤ 푎 ≤ 7 ;
푏푖푎,푡 = 휌
푖
푡
3∑
푖=0
푤푎−푖,푡−푖
4
for 8 ≤ 푎 ≤ 15 .
(20)
5Shareholders may belong to different age groups and have different consumption levels. Still, they all have
the same discount factor given by 11+휃
푢′푐푎+1,푡+1
푢′푐푎,푡
= 푅−1푡+1 , ∀푎 휖 {0, 14}.
11
The retirement benefit is computed from the average wage during the last four periods. Total
transfer expenditures are then equal to:
푇푡 = 휌
푢
푡
7∑
푎=0
푤푎,푡 푢푎,푡 푍푎,푡 + 휌
푒
푡
7∑
푎=6
푤푎,푡 푒푎,푡 푍푎,푡 + 휌
푖
푡
3∑
푖=0
푤푎−푖,푡−푖
4
15∑
푎=8
푍푎,푡. (21)
Public consumption is assumed to be a fraction of output, net of vacancy costs, i.e.
퐺푡 = 푔¯ (푌푡 − a푉푡). (22)
We further assume that the “government” balances its budget in every (five-year) period by
adjusting consumption taxes (i.e., 휏 푐푡 is the adjusting variable):6
휏 푐푡 퐶푡 + (휏
푤
푡 + 휁푡)
(∑
푎
푤푎,푡 푛푎,푡 푃푎,푡
)
= 퐺푡 + 푇푡 , (23)
where aggregate consumption 퐶푡 =
∑
푎 푐푎,푡 푍푎,푡. For convenience, we assume no public debt.
Public debt could be introduced by postulating an exogenous path of the debt, and assuming
that the deficit adjusts (via 휏 푐) to match that path.
2.6 Wages
Wages are renegotiated in every period. They are determined by a standard Nash bargaining
rule:
max
푤푎,푡
(
∂푊 퐹푡
∂푁푎,푡
)1−휂 (
1
푢′푐푎,푡
∂푊퐻푡
∂푁푎,푡
)휂
. (24)
where ∂푊퐻푡 /∂푁푎,푡 is given by Equation (13) and ∂푊 퐹푡 /∂푁푎,푡 by Equation (19).
The first-order optimality condition can then be written:
(1− 휂) 1
푢′푐푎,푡
∂푊퐻푡
∂푁푎,푡
= 휂
1− 휏푤푡
(1 + 휁푡)(1 + 휏 푐푡 )
∂푊 퐹푡
∂푁푎,푡
. (25)
2.7 Capital Market Equilibrium
Let 푄푡 denote the total financial value of firms at time 푡. In our deterministic setup, the return
on equities must be equal to the market interest rate. In other words, the value of equities must
be such that, for all 푡 ≥ 0:
푄푡+1 + Π푡+1
푄푡
= 푅푡+1 . (26)
The left-hand side is the return of one unit of savings investment in equities while the right-hand
side is the return if invested in firms’ bonds.
6Changes in 휏 푐푡 affect all incomes in the same way, while changes in 휏푤푡 , for instance, would change net
replacement rates.
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Equilibrium on the capital market then implies that:
퐾푡+1 +푄푡 =
14∑
푎=0
푠푎,푡 푍푎,푡 . (27)
2.8 Intertemporal General Equilibrium
We shall consider two versions of the model, one with frictions and the other with perfect
competition on the labor market. The two corresponding intertemporal general equilibria are
formally defined In Definitions 1 and 2 below.
Definition 1 Given the following exogenous processes and initial conditions:
– demographic variables {푥푡}푡=0..+∞ (fertility), {훽푎,푡}푎=0..15푡=0..+∞ (mortality), {푋푎,푡}푎=0..15푡=0..+∞ (mi-
gration),
– policy variables {휌푢푡 , 휌푒푡 , 휌푖푡}푡=0..+∞ (replacement rates) and {휏푤푡 , 휁푡}푡=0..+∞ (tax rates),
– initial population {푍푎,−1}푎=0..15, assets {푠푎,−1}푎=0..14 and capital stock 퐾¯0 <
14∑
푎=0
푠푎,−1푍푎,−1,
an inter-temporal equilibrium with perfect foresight and labor market frictions is
such that:
1. saving {푠푎,푡}푎=0..14푡=0..+∞, consumption {푐푎,푡}푎=0..15푡=0..+∞ and early-retirement decisions {푒푎,푡, 휆푎,푡}푎=6,7푡=0..+∞
maximize households’ utility (10) subject to budget constraint (11) and to (5);
2. capital input {퐾푡}푡=0..+∞, posted vacancies {푉푡}푡=0..+∞ and output {푌푡}푡=0..+∞ maximize
firms’ profits (16) subject to (8), (9), (14), and 퐾0 = 퐾¯0;
3. the number of new hires {푀푡}푡=0..+∞, the probability of finding a job {푝푡}푡=0..+∞ and of
filling a vacancy {푞푡}푡=0..+∞, and the employment rates {푛푎,푡}푎=0..7푡=0..+∞ satisfy the matching
technology (6), (8) and (9);
4. total population and the population of working age {푍푎,푡, 푃푎,푡}푎=0..7푡=0..+∞, and the number of
job seekers {Ω푡}푡=0..+∞ satisfy the population dynamics (1), (2), (3) and (7);
5. unemployment {푢푎,푡}푎=0..7푡=0..+∞ is such that the time constraint (4) holds;
6. wages {푤푎,푡}푎=0..7푡=0..+∞ are negotiated following the Nash bargaining rule (24);
7. government benefits {푏푢푡 푏푒푡 , 푏푖푡}푡=0..+∞ follow the rules defined by (20), and government
spending {퐺푡}푡=0..+∞ follow (22);
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8. consumption taxes {휏 푐푡 }푡=0..+∞ are set by the government to balance its budget (23);
9. stock market prices and interest rate {푄푡, 푅푡}푡=0..+∞ satisfy the arbitrage condition (26)
and the financial market clearing condition (27).
Definition 2 Given the same exogenous processes and initial conditions as in Definition 1, an
inter-temporal equilibrium with perfect foresight with frictionless labor market is
such that:
1. saving {푠푎,푡}푎=0..14푡=0..+∞, consumption {푐푎,푡}푎=0..15푡=0..+∞ and early-retirement decisions {푒푎,푡, 휆푎,푡}푎=6,7푡=0..+∞
maximize households’ utility (10) subject to budget constraint (11) and to (5);
2. capital input {퐾푡}푡=0..+∞, posted vacancies {푉푡}푡=0..+∞ and output {푌푡}푡=0..+∞ maximize
firms’ profits (16) subject to 푞푡 = 1, (9), (14), 푎 = 0 and 퐾0 = 퐾¯0;
3. the number of new hires {푀푡}푡=0..+∞ satisfies 푀푡 = 푉푡, the probability of finding a job
{푝푡}푡=0..+∞ and of filling a vacancy {푞푡}푡=0..+∞ satisfy 푞푡 = 푝1 = 1, and the employment
rates {푛푎,푡}푡=0..+∞,푎=0..7 satisfy (9);
4. total population and the population of working age {푍푎,푡, 푃푎,푡}푎=0..7푡=0..+∞, and the number of
job seekers {Ω푡}푡=0..+∞ satisfy the population dynamics (1), (2), (3) and (7);
5. wages {푤푎,푡}푎=0..7푡=0..+∞ are such that 푛푎,푡 + 푒푎,푡 = 1;
6. government benefits {푏푢푡 푏푒푡 , 푏푖푡}푡=0..+∞ follow the rules defined by (20);
7. consumption taxes {휏 푐푡 }푡=0..+∞ are set by the government to balance its budget (23);
8. the interest rate {푅푡}푡=0..+∞ satisfies the financial market clearing condition (27).
3 Calibration
Our objective is to reexamine the channels by which population aging affects the economy
in an OLG setup with labor market frictions. More specifically we want to evaluate the role
of labor market imperfections and the interactions between pension reforms and the labor
market. Our calibration is meant to represent a European situation, such as France, with fairly
generous unemployment benefits and public pensions, and substantial early-retirement benefits
inducing low participation rates among elderly workers. The parameters of the model fall into
four categories: (i) general technological and preference parameters; (ii) parameters specific to
the frictional labor market; (iii) parameters determining taxes and transfers; (iv) parameters
determining demographic changes (fertility, mortality, migration).
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Technological and Preference Parameters
We assume a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function. The elasticity of
output with respect to capital is set at 훼 = 0.33. In order to focus on the effects of demographic
changes, we leave aside technological progress and assume constant values of the TFP and
age-specific human capital parameters (퐴푡 and ℎ푎,푡 respectively). To reproduce the life cycle
profile of wages, we assume that a worker’s productivity increases with age until 50, and then
decreases, but only very slowly so, as suggested by empirical findings (see for instance Kotlikoff
and Gokhale, 1992, Johnson and Neumark, 1996 or Aubert and Crépon, 2003). Bargained
wages broadly follow the same pattern, with a negative age effect (due the shorter expected job
duration of older workers) on top of the productivity effect.
We assume that the instantaneous utility is logarithmic in consumption, so that the wealth
and substitution effects of a change in the interest rate cancel each other out. The subjective
rate of time preference is given the customary value of 1% per quarter. The depreciation rate
of capital is then set at 2.5% per quarter, so as to obtain a capital-output ratio equal to 2.40
on a yearly basis in 2010 (2.5 in the final steady state). There is no bequest motive. Given
the assumed demographic structure (see below), the resulting real interest rate is 6.80% p.a.
in 2010 (5.3% in the final steady state), in line with the equilibrium interest rates in similar
models (e.g. 6.6% in 2005 in Attanasio et al., 2007, and 7.4% in Krueger and Ludwig, 2007).
Although these interest rate levels may seem high at first sight, Attanasio et al. (2007, p.165)
notice that they are still lower than the postwar real return on equities. Individual consumption
rises over the life cycle and savings are negative during the first two periods of life.
We set the labor disutility parameter 푑푛 at 0.25. It implies that, for the different generations, the
marginal disutility of employment (divided by the marginal utility of consumption) represents
between 15% and 20% of the wage income in 2010 (similar numbers in the final steady state).
This relative value of domestic activity is hard to measure empirically. Using German data,
Frick at al. (2011) show that the average wage income advantages from home production is
between 30% and 60%, depending on the methodology. However, using a GDP approach,
Giannelli et al. (2012) find that Germany has by far the highest value of home production
among the 24 EU countries. Our values therefore seem acceptable in light of these results.
In the EU15, early-retirement rates for workers aged 50-59 and 60-64 were respectively 16%
and 52% in 2010.7 The values of the two leisure (early-retirement) parameters 푑푒6 = 0.031 and
푑푒7 = 0.049 are chosen to reproduce these two early-retirement numbers in the year 2010 (note
7Because our analysis abstracts from people who are neither active nor early retired, senior activity rates
are computed from the data (OECD.Stat) by subtracting from the population the fraction of people aged 55-64
who are neither contributors nor pensioners. This fraction is approximated by the proportion of non-active
population aged 50-54 years over the corresponding previous periods of time. To limit this adjustment, we also
only focus on the male population.
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that we respectively obtain 3% and 8% in the final steady state). Parameter 휙 is set to 0.80,
which implies a Frisch elasticity of around 0.6, in line with estimated values (see Den Haan and
Kaltenbrunner, 2009)8.
Labor Market Parameters
The matching process is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function.
The elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies 휈 and the bargaining power of workers 휂 are
both fixed at 0.50, as it is generally the case in the related literature. For the EU15, Bassanini
and Marianna (2009, Figure 4) report an average job destruction rate of about 8% per annum
in some European countries (Germany, Finland and Sweden). We therefore fix our quarterly
job separation rate 휒 at 2% (this gives a destruction rate of 33.24% over a five-year period).
The matching efficiency parameter 휇 and the vacancy cost a are chosen to be 0.90 and 43.5
respectively, so that the final steady state probabilities (over a five-year period) of finding a job
푝 and of filling a vacancy 푞 are both equal to 90% in the final steady state. Imposing 푝 = 푞 at
the steady state, which implies a unitary labor market tightness, is a standard strategy in the
related literature (see for instance de Walque et al., 2009).
This calibration also allows to capture quite well several labor market statistics for the year
2010. First, Figure 1 shows that our simulated employment rates per age are very close to
the corresponding employment rates in the EU15.9 Second, 푞 = 0.98 in 2010. It means the
probability that a vacancy is unfilled after 5 years is 2%. Farm (2004) reports that between
2000 and 2004, around 40% of Swedish vacancies were not yet filled after one quarter. The
Finish Job vacancy survey (www.stat.fi) provides a similar number for the years 2006–2011.
The French Employment Agency reports that in 2007, 10.5% of vacancies were unfilled after
one year (see Fondeur and Zanda, 2009, for a discussion). Although the notion of unfilled
vacancies differs across studies and countries, we can reasonably think that most vacancies are
filled after a five-year period which justifies our 푞 = 0.98. Moreover, we have 푝 = 0.82 which,
together with 푞 = 0.98, gives a labor market tightness of 0.84. Third, the per period value of
the vacancy cost a represents 36% of the gross wage of a 45-year-old worker and, although there
is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of these costs, seems in a plausible range.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
8The Frisch elasticity is 푒1−푒
1
휙 .
9EU15 data are from OECD.Stat. As already explained in footnote 7, we remove from these data people
who are neither active nor early retired, to be in accordance with our model. Again, we only focus on the male
population.
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Taxes and Transfers
Government consumption is a constant fraction of GDP (푔¯ =20%). The gross replacement rate
for unemployed workers is fixed at 휌푢 = 0.40, implying a net replacement rate of about 47%.
Actual net replacement rates vary a lot across countries and unemployment durations. The
chosen value is close to the OECD median value for a two-year unemployment spell (see OECD,
2009, Table 1.6). The replacement rate for early-retirement is assumed to remain constant, at
휌푒 = 0.50. The reference wage used to compute pension benefits is typically an average of wages
in the best years of activity. For simplicity, we define the reference wage as the average wage
of workers aged 45-64. At a given replacement rate, our formulation implies that pensions are
indexed on current wages (rather than prices). We calibrate the pension replacement rate 휌푖푡
on French data, as reported in EC (2009). The 2000 value is 휌푖 = 0.55. The French pension
reforms of 1993 and 2003 are however expected to progressively decrease this replacement rate
through three main channels: (i) reference wage calculated over a longer period; (ii) indexation
to prices rather than wages; (iii) increase in the number of years of activity required to have
full pension rights10. The effects of these reforms will appear progressively in future years and
should mean a 20 percentage points decrease in the value of the replacement rate by 2035 (30
percentage points by the year 2050). These changes are included in our base scenario (see Table
1).
Demographic Variables
Expected population growth rates vary across countries. We chose to calibrate the main de-
mographic variables on French data. Survival probabilities from 1900 till 2100 are taken from
Vallin and Meslé (2001). The expected decrease in mortality rates is illustrated in the left panel
of figure 2. These changes imply that life expectancies at birth would increase from 77.9 years in
2000 to 86.5 in 2050 and 90.8 in 2095. Fertility and migration shocks (variables 푥푡 and 푋푎,푡+푎)
are calibrated so as to reproduce the population changes (by age category) observed or expected
to take place from 1900 till 2100. The projections till 2050 are the latest ones published by
INSEE (see Robert-Bobée, 2006, updated in April 2007)11. We assume that the population sta-
bilizes progressively after 2050. These projections are illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2.
The reported population changes (total and adults over 24) imply a quasi-constant population
of age 25-64. The dependency ratio (defined as the ratio between the population over 64 and
that aged 25-64) increased around 10 percentage points between 1950 and 2000; it is expected
to double during the next sixty years, reaching 60% in 2060 and stabilizing at 69% after 2100.
[FIGURE 2, PANELS a AND b ABOUT HERE]
10See Bozio (2008) for an ex post evaluation of the effects of this reform.
11Available at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=PROJPOPACT0650#a1
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Eigenvalues
Once the model has been calibrated, we can assess the convergence speed by computing the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system around the steady state. It is
generally found that such eigenvalues are complex numbers which generate non-monotonic
dynamics (see Azariadis, Bullard and Ohanian, 2004). Figure 3 represents the stable eigenvalues
of the two models. Considering only the largest eigenvalues, which are those that matter as far
as sluggishness is concerned, we observe that those of the model with frictions are larger, but
the difference is very small. We conclude from this that labor market frictions do not mean
more sluggishness compared to a Walrasian set-up, at least in an OLG model with five-year
periods.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
4 Simulation Results
We first present the simulation results obtained in the base scenario and illustrate the specific
impact of migration and fertility shocks. We then highlight the role of labor market imperfec-
tions by contrasting the results of the base scenario with those obtained under the assumption
of a competitive labor market. To illustrate the properties and quantitative implications of our
model, we next examine two hypothetical policy scenarios assumed to take place after 2000,
the elimination of early-retirement payments and the shift to a fully-funded pension scheme.
We finally discuss the sensitivity of our results, especially with respect to international capital
flows and annuity market imperfections.
4.1 Base Scenario
The base scenario incorporates the following exogenous shocks, described in the previous section:
(i) decreasing mortality rates; (ii) fertility and migration shocks; (iii) a decreasing replacement
rate 휌푖푡 after 2005, as a consequence of the 1993 and 2003 pension reforms. We simulate the
model under the assumption that the year 1900 was a steady state. After 2100, all exogenous
variables keep the same value and the economy progressively converges to a new, final steady
state. The period of interest is the transition taking place during the 21st century (2000-2100).
Values simulated for that sub-period are unlikely to be affected by the initial conditions (1900
values).
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Main Results
Figure 4 shows the change in some key variables in the base scenario (solid line). Disregard
temporarily the dotted line. Population aging implies increased savings and capital accumu-
lation (not shown in the figure). Because of diminishing returns, the interest rate decreases.
Capital accumulation also leads to a substantial increase in average labor productivity (and
wages). All this stimulates firms’ profitability and the number of job openings. As a result, the
aggregate employment rate increases. This higher employment rate also comes from the supply
side through an increase in the participation rate of elderly workers (55-64). In an unchanged
institutional environment, that is at given replacement rate, the higher participation rate of
elderly workers (less early retirement) is due mainly to the increased probability of having a
job (see Equation (12)), which we can interpret as a lower “discouragement” effect. Moreover,
through the Euler equation, lower interest rates smooth the optimal consumption plan, which
reinforces the labour supply of the elderly. Globally, between 2000 and 2100, the aggregate em-
ployment rate raises by about 6.4 percentage points. Figure 5 shows that the increase is much
stronger for the oldest – working – generations. Moreover, we see that most of the increase is
between 2000 and 2050.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] [FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The estimated cost of public pensions (including early-retirement benefits, and measured in
% of GDP) follows quite closely the projected values for France given in EC (2009) for the
period 2000-2060 and calculated under the assumption of an (approximately) 5 percentage
points (exogenous) increase in the aggregate employment rate. Thanks to the pension reforms
decided in 1993-2003, the increase in public pension costs over the period 2000-2060 is no more
than 1-1.5 percentage point (instead of 7 percentage points in a simulation without pension
reform). We find however that, after 2070, the continuing aging of the population may lead to
additional and substantial increases in the cost of public pensions.
The Contribution of Fertility and Migration Shocks
The cost of a given public pensions scheme in percent of GDP depends both on the expected
increases in longevity and the size of the migration and fertility shocks. To separate these
two effects, we simulated the model again with all fertility and migration variables set at their
2100 values. The results are summarized in Figure 6, which indicates by how much the cost of
public pensions is changed by current and past fertility and migration shocks. During the first
two decades, the effect is strongly negative. This is the continuation of the baby boom effect,
which maintains the dependency ratio at low levels. After 2025, the effect becomes positive:
baby-boomers retire, and the dependency ratio remains above normal for about five periods.
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After 2060, the effect of fertility and migration shocks becomes negligible, ie, the increase in
the cost of public pensions after 2060 (see Figure 4) is solely driven by longevity effects.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Competitive vs Frictional Labor Markets
Increased longevity changes the savings behavior of households and pushes the equilibrium
interest rate downwards. Firms use more capital, which pushes labor productivity and la-
bor demand upwards. The final impact on employment depends on the working of the labor
market. In models with search frictions, labor demand changes may affect the equilibrium
(un-)employment rate. To evaluate the quantitative importance of such adjustments along the
extensive margin, we simulate the equilibrium with a frictionless labor market (Definition 2).
The participation decision of elderly workers remains endogenous and determined in exactly
the same fashion as before (see Equation (12) for workers aged 60-64), where the employment
probability for participating workers is now equal to one (휋7,푡+7 = 1).
The comparison between the two economies is summarized in Figure 4. Values for the perfectly
competitive economy are represented by a dotted line. In the competitive setup, employment
rate changes can only arise from changes in the participation rate of elderly workers. Because
there is no unemployment risk and the market wage is higher, there is little early-retirement in
the competitive economy, although the generosity of the early-retirement scheme is the same
as in the frictional labor market economy. Moreover, through the Euler equation, the lower
interest rate in the competitive economy smoothes the increase in the optimal consumption
plan, which implies relatively more labor supply at older ages.
Despite increased labor productivity and wages, the participation rate of elderly workers thus
barely changes and has a negligible impact on the aggregate employment rate. The comparison
with the frictional labor market economy is striking. In the frictional market, the increased
labor demand leads to higher employment probabilities for all age groups. A higher employ-
ment probability has a significant impact on the participation of elderly workers. Overall,
the employment rate increases significantly, and stimulates further capital accumulation and
investment. Altogether, the aggregate employment rate increases by more than 6%.
These differences explain why the two economies react differently to the pension reforms and the
ensuing decrease in compensation rates. The cost of public pensions is initially smaller in the
competitive economy (because there is less early-retirement). In the next 30 years, it increases
by 2.7 percentage points and becomes larger than in the frictional economy (where the increase
is 1.3 percentage points). This difference reflects the different impact of pension reforms on
employment rates, and the failure of the competitive model to account for adjustments along
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the extensive margin.12
4.3 Policy Scenarios
We focus on two policy scenarios and compare their implications in the frictional and the
competitive economies. The first scenario is a complete elimination of all early-retirement
payments after 2000. The second is a shift to a fully-funded system, announced in 2005 and
taking place in 2015. These two scenarios are admittedly extreme ones. They facilitate the
comparisons between the two economies (frictional and competitive) and the interpretation of
the mechanisms at work.
Early-retirement reform
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The consequences of the elimination of all early-retirement benefits are illustrated in Figure 7.
This labor market policy change stimulates the participation of elderly workers, both in the
frictional and in the competitive economy. All effects are qualitatively similar, but of a totally
different magnitude, and much stronger in the frictional economy. In the competitive economy,
because there is no unemployment and the equilibrium wage is higher, the initial participation
rate is already high, and increases by 10 percentage points (from 85 to 95% at the time of
the shock), compared to 25 percentage points (from 68 to 93%) in the frictional economy.
The induced impact effects on employment, capital productivity (the interest rate), wages and
consumption (both decline at impact) are thus much more pronounced in the frictional economy.
There is also (at impact) an increase in the unemployment rate of younger workers. Eventually,
the unemployment rate returns to its initial value, but employment, wages and output increase
more in the frictional economy. The cost of public pensions (in % of GDP) decreases in the long
run by 1.5 percentage points in the frictional economy (1 percentage point in the competitive
economy). Short run effects are larger, because the activity rates of older workers also react in
the longer run to changes in the unemployment rate and other variables engineered by capital
accumulation and the falling interest rate.
Moreover, focusing on the frictional economy and comparing figures 4 and 7, we observe that our
early retirement reform almost completely offsets the public pension cost of the demographic
shocks. We can relate this result to Haan and Prowse (2011). Using a different approach
12The comparison between the competitive and the frictional economies does not change much if we keep
the activity rates of older workers fixed at their 2000 values. Employment rates then change only as a result
of unemployment rate changes. In that scenario, the increase in pension costs between 2000 and 2035 is 1.11
percentage points larger in the competitive economy than in the frictional economy.
21
(estimated life-cycle model on German micro-data), they show that the fiscal consequences of
the anticipated increase in life expectancy can be offset by an increase of 4.3 years in the full
pensionable age.
Shift from a PAYG to a FF Pension Scheme
Figure 8 illustrates the effects of announcing in 2005 that a shift to a purely fully-funded
system will take place in 2015. We first consider the frictional economy. At impact, aggregate
consumption falls, and savings and capital accumulation rise, which leads (with a one-period lag)
to a lower interest rate. The accumulation of capital and its positive effect on labor productivity
stimulates labor demand and job creation (the unemployment rate starts falling) as well as
wage growth. The activity rate of elderly workers increases, by 12 percentage points at impact
(when consumption has fallen) and 5 percentage points in the long run (when consumption has
increased). The equilibrium unemployment rate is about 2.5 percentage points lower in the
long run, and implies a substantially larger output (and consumption) level (not shown in the
figure).
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
In the competitive economy, the unemployment rate cannot vary; the participation rate of el-
derly workers increases by 3 percentage points. Aggregate employment barely changes. Capital
accumulation leads to a larger output level, but this effect is not reinforced by job creation, as
in the frictional economy.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
The objective of this section is to check to what extent our results might depend on specific
assumptions. We repeated the previous simulation experiments for different values of a few key
parameters: the subjective rate of time preference (휃 = 0 instead of 0.01), bargaining power
(휂 = 0.70 instead of 0.50), concavity of leisure utility (휙 = 0.90 or more, instead of 0.80). Such
changes did not alter our main conclusions and are not reproduced here.13 Instead we focus on
the role of international capital flows and their interactions with labor market imperfections,
as well as on the consequences of an imperfect annuity market.
13As discussed above, assuming linear preferences in leisure (휙 = 0) would imply an infinitely large Frisch
elasticity and unrealistically large swings in participation rates.
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5.1 International Capital Flows
We here contrast the closed economy scenario with the small open economy one. In the latter,
the interest rate is exogenous. Most actual economies are in between these two extremes.
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 9 shows the development of the key variables already considered in the base scenario
(see Figure 4) and compares them to the values obtained with the small open economy model.
In both the closed and the small open economy, population aging implies increased savings and
asset accumulation. In the small open economy, agents can borrow or lend freely from the rest
of the world, at given interest rate, assumed to remain constant. In the closed economy, agents
can only save by accumulating domestic capital; because of diminishing returns, the interest
rate decreases. This difference in interest rates explains all the other differences. With constant
returns to savings in the small open economy, per capita consumption remains almost constant
during the demographic transition, while it substantially decreases in the closed economy. In
the closed economy, domestic capital accumulation leads to a substantial increase in average
labor productivity (hence in gross wages), and also an increase in aggregate employment. This
higher employment level comes from both a decrease in the unemployment rate of young and
mature workers (25-54) and from an increase in the participation rate of elderly workers (55-
64). These effects are related to capital accumulation and lower interest rates, which increase
profitability and the number of job openings. These changes imply a higher optimal average
retirement age (less early-retirement), in an unchanged institutional environment. These effects
are non-existent in the small open economy with fixed interest rates. This contrast has large
implications for the cost of public pensions. In the small open economy, population aging
implies a 2 percentage point increase in the cost of public pensions between 2000 and 2060,
compared to 0.5% in the closed economy. It is worth stressing that pension costs (in % of GDP)
evolve in similar ways in the small open economy with frictions and in the closed economy with
perfect competition. This is because in both cases the employment level does not vary much
and does not amplify the effects of policy changes.
Both Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2007) have already stressed the role of
international capital flows in determining how an economy will react to population aging. We
obtain a similar conclusion and emphasize that in economies with a frictional labor market,
changes in the equilibrium unemployment rate provide an additional mechanism by which
international capital flows may affect the adjustment process and the future cost of public
pensions (as a % of GDP). With frictional labor markets, even the fiscal variables are affected
by capital flows.
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5.2 Imperfect annuity market
So far, our model does not allow for uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. For instance, there exists
a perfect insurance against individual lifetime uncertainty, as if there were a perfect annuity
market. In practice, perfect annuities may not exist, forcing individuals to leave involuntary
bequests and to consume less during their retirement period (Feldstein, 1990). In this section,
we analyze the quantitative role of idiosyncratic uncertainty through an imperfect annuity
market.14 To do so, we assume that if an individual dies at the end of a period, her financial
wealth is not fully redistributed among surviving agents from the same generation but – partially
– goes to the government.15 The budget constraint (11) becomes:[
(1− 휏푤푡+푎)푤푎,푡+푎 . 푛푎,푡+푎 + 푏푢푎,푡+푎 . 푢푎,푡+푎 + 푏푒푎,푡+푎 . 푒푎,푡+푎
]
. 푧푎,푡+푎 + 푏
푖
푎,푡+푎 . (1− 푧푎,푡+푎)
+
(
훽푎−1,푡+푎−1
훽푎,푡+푎
)휛
푅푡+푎 푠푎−1,푡+푎−1 = (1 + 휏 푐푡+푎) 푐푎,푡+푎 + 푠푎,푡+푎 ,
(28)
where 휛 ∈ [0, 1]. 휛 = 1 implies a perfect insurance against lifetime uncertainty as in the
benchmark model whereas a lower 휛 reduces the redistribution within a generation. This gives
the Euler equation:
푢′푐푎,푡+푎
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎
=
1
1 + 휃
(
훽푎+1,푡+푎+1
훽푎,푡+푎
)1−휛
푅푡+푎+1
푢′푐푎+1,푡+푎+1
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎+1
. (29)
It is worth noting that imperfect annuity market also modifies the government budget equa-
tion (23). Since the government partially receives unintended savings, the level of the con-
sumption tax rate required to balance the budget can be reduced (from 20.1% in 2000 when
휛 = 1 to 18.0% when 휛 = 0.8). Figure 10 shows that introducing imperfect annuities re-
duces the income of the older generations, which decreases their savings and – especially – their
consumption. Imperfect annuities therefore give a more realistic picture of the consumption
distribution. Moreover, figure 11 shows that when a perfect insurance against longevity risks
does not exist anymore, the younger generations (until 50) slightly increase their saving rate
whereas the older generations reduce it. This setup therefore introduces precautionary saving
motives.
[FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE] [FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE]
Although imperfect annuities reduce the level of activity, they do not affect significantly our
main results. For instance, appendix B shows that the base scenario described in section 4.1
14Most papers with idiosyncratic uncertainty focus on the political support for social security reform. For
instance, Conesa and Krueger (1998) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) show that the status quo bias in
favor of an unfunded social security system is stronger in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. Díaz-
Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009) study the welfare implications of delaying the statutory retirement age.
15Alternatively, we could assume she leaves – unintended – bequests to a younger generation.
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and 4.2 remains almost unaffected by the introduction of imperfect annuities, both in the
frictional or in the perfectly competitive setups. Our conclusions about the effects of policy
changes as described in section 4.3 remain also mainly unchanged.
The fact that precautionary savings do not fundamentally change the effects of aggregate shocks
is consistent with Krusell et al. (2010). They build a search and matching model with uninsur-
able idiosyncratic shocks.16 They show that incomplete markets do not quantitatively change
the effects of aggregate shocks on labor market variables. However, the conclusions regarding
the welfare analysis may substantially differ when incompleteness is taken into account.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced labor market frictions and early-retirement decisions into an otherwise
standard OLG setup with population aging. In this setup, we show that population aging
reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, through its effect on capital accumulation, the
interest rate and job openings. We have also shown that these effects can be substantially
reinforced by endogenous participation rate changes (lower early-retirement rates).
Introducing frictions also changes the quantitative effects of policy changes (for instance lower
retirement benefits), again via the effect of these policies on savings, the interest rate and
equilibrium unemployment.
By contrasting the results obtained in the case of a small open economy with those of a closed
economy, we have illustrated the importance of capital flows. When the interest rate is ex-
ogenously determined on world financial markets, population aging and pension reforms have
similar effects on employment rates and the fiscal variables (public pension costs), although the
implications for per capita consumption and the saving rate may be quite different.
In a two-country model, the interest rate would again be endogenous, and the new transmission
mechanisms introduced by labor market frictions would work in much the same way as in the
closed economy model, at least qualitatively. Future research should focus on interest rate
determination and the impact of asymmetric labor market institutions in a multi-country setup.
16In our life-cycle setup, we introduce idiosyncratic risks through the lack of perfect annuities. Instead, Krusell
et al. (2010) have infinitely-lived agents and introduce uninsurable earnings shocks.
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Appendix A: The Household Optimization Problem
With initial and final financial wealth equal to zero (no bequests), the household’s intertemporal
budget constraint can be written as: 17
15∑
푎=0
푅−1푡,푡+푎 훽푎,푡+푎
{[
(1− 휏푤푡+푎)푤푎,푡+푎 푛푎,푡+푎 + 푏푢푎,푡+푎 푢푎,푡+푎 + 푏푒푎,푡+푎 푒푎,푡+푎
+푏푖푎,푡+푎 푖푎,푡+푎
]
. 푧푎,푡+푎 − (1 + 휏 푐푡+푎) 푐푎,푡+푎
}
= 0 .
(30)
The discount factor 푅푡,푡+푎 is defined by 푅푡,푡 = 1 and 푅푡,푡+푗 = Π푎푗=1푅푡+푗 for 푗 ≥ 1.
The values of 푐푎,푡+푎, 휆6,푡+6 and 휆7,푡+7 maximizing the household objective function (10) subject
to (5) and (9) and the intertemporal budget constraint (30) can thus be obtained from the
maximization of the Lagrangean function
푊퐻푡
푍0,푡
= max
푐푎,푡+푎, 휆6,푡+6, 휆7,푡+7
15∑
푎=0
훽푎,푡+푎
{
훽푎
(
푢(푐푎,푡+푎)− 푑푛 푛푎,푡+푎 . 푧푎,푡+푎 + 푑푒푎
(푒푎,푡+푎)
1−휙
1− 휙 푧푎,푡+푎
)
+ 휇푡푅
−1
푡,푡+푎
([
푏푢푎,푡+푎 +
(
(1− 휏푤푡+푎)푤푎,푡+푎 − 푏푢푎,푡+푎
)
푛푎,푡+푎
+ (푏푒푎,푡+푎 − 푏푢푎,푡+푎) 푒푎,푡+푎
]
. 푧푎,푡+푎 − (1 + 휏 푐푡+푎) 푐푎,푡+푎
)}
,
where 휇푡 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint. The
optimal values of 푐푎,푡+푎, 휆6,푡+6 and 휆7,푡+7 must satisfy the first-order optimality conditions:
훽푎
푢′푐푎,푡+푎
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎
= 휇푡푅
−1
푡,푡+푎 ; (31)
[
푑푛
∂푛6,푡+6
∂휆6,푡+6
− 푑푒6 (푒6,푡+6)−휙
∂푒6,푡+6
∂휆6,푡+6
]
+ 훽
훽7,푡+7
훽6,푡+6
[
푑푛
∂푛7,푡+7
∂휆6,푡+6
− 푑푒7 (푒7,푡+7)−휙
∂푒7,푡+7
∂휆6,푡+6
]
=
푢′푐6,푡+6
1 + 휏 푐푡+6
[(
(1− 휏푤푡+6)푤6,푡+6 − 푏푢6,푡+6
) ∂푛6,푡+6
∂휆6,푡+6
+
(
푏푒6,푡+6 − 푏푢6,푡+6
) ∂푒6,푡+6
∂휆6,푡+6
]
+ 훽
훽7,푡+7
훽6,푡+6
푢′푐7,푡+7
1 + 휏 푐푡+7
[(
(1− 휏푤푡+7)푤7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
) ∂푛7,푡+7
∂휆6,푡+6
+
(
푏푒7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
) ∂푒7,푡+7
∂휆6,푡+6
]
;
(32)
[
푑푛
∂푛7,푡+7
∂휆7,푡+7
− 푑푒7 (푒7,푡+7)−휙
∂푒7,푡+7
∂휆7,푡+7
]
=
푢′푐7,푡+7
1 + 휏 푐푡+7
[(
(1− 휏푤푡+7)푤7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
) ∂푛7,푡+7
∂휆7,푡+7
+
(
푏푒7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
) ∂푒7,푡+7
∂휆7,푡+7
]
.
(33)
17It is clear from Equation (30) that consumption taxes have the same effect as income taxes.
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In these expressions,
∂푒6,푡+6
∂휆6,푡+6
= 1 ;
∂푒7,푡+7
∂휆6,푡+6
= (1− 휆7,푡+7) ; ∂푒7,푡+7
∂휆7,푡+7
= (1− 휆6,푡+6) ;
∂푛6,푡+6
∂휆6,푡+6
= − 푛푡+6
1− 휆푡+6 ;
∂푛7,푡+7
∂휆6,푡+6
= − 푛푡+7
1− 휆푡+6 ;
∂푛7,푡+7
∂휆7,푡+7
= − 푛푡+7
1− 휆푡+7 .
The first optimality condition (31) is the usual Euler condition. It implies that
푢′푐푎,푡+푎
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎
= 훽 푅푡+푎+1
푢′푐푎+1,푡+푎+1
1 + 휏 푐푡+푎+1
.
The other two optimality conditions are specific to this model and determine the activity rate
of older workers. After substitution and rearrangement, and with the assumption that 푢(푐푎,푡+푎)
is logarithmic, these optimality conditions can be recast as follows:[
푏푒6,푡+6 − 푏푢6,푡+6
(1 + 휏 푐푡+6) 푐6,푡+6
+ 푑푒6 (푒6,푡+6)
−휙
]
(1− 푒6,푡+6)
+ 훽
훽7,푡+7
훽6,푡+6
[
푏푒7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
+ 푑푒7 (푒7,푡+7)
−휙
]
(1− 푒7,푡+7)
=
[
(1− 휏푤푡+6)푤6,푡+6 − 푏푢6,푡+6
(1 + 휏 푐푡+6) 푐6,푡+6
− 푑푛
]
푛6,푡+6
+ 훽
훽7,푡+7
훽6,푡+6
[
(1− 휏푤푡+7)푤7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
− 푑푛
]
푛7,푡+7 ,
(34)
and[
푏푒7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7)푐7,푡+7
+ 푑푒7 (푒7,푡+7)
−휙
]
(1− 푒7,푡+7) =
[
(1− 휏푤푡+7)푤7,푡+7 − 푏푢7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7)푐7,푡+7
− 푑푛
]
푛7,푡+7. (35)
The economic interpretation of these optimality conditions becomes easier if we note that the
unconditional probability of having a job is given by
휋푎,푡+푎 =
푛푎,푡+푎
푛푎,푡+푎 + 푢푎,푡+푎
=
푛푎,푡+푎
1− 푒푎,푡+푎 ,
so that the last optimality condition can be written as
푏푒7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
+푑푒7 (푒7,푡+7)
−휙 = 휋7,푡+7
[
(1− 휏푤푡+7)푤7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
− 푑푛
]
+ (1−휋7,푡+7)
[
푏푢7,푡+7
(1 + 휏 푐푡+7) 푐7,푡+7
]
,
and similarly for the other optimality condition.
Appendix B: Base scenario with imperfect annuities
We here reproduce the base scenario of sections 4.1 and 4.2 (effects of demography and past
pension reforms in frictional (solid line) and perfectly competitive (dotted line) economies) but
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with imperfect annuities. We see the results are very to those displayed in Figure 4. We obtain
the same similarities when simulating the other scenarios.
[FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE]
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Symbol Value Symbol Value
Production function
퐴 20.000 훼 0.33
훿 (quarterly) 0.025
Age-dependent productivity
ℎ0 2.70 ℎ1 3.30
ℎ2 3.85 ℎ3 4.45
ℎ4 5.00 ℎ5 5.80
ℎ6 5.60 ℎ7 5.50
Preferences
휃 (quarterly) 0.010 푑푛 0.250
푑푒6 0.031 푑푒7 0.049
휙 0.800
Labor Market
휇 0.90 휈 0.50
휒 (quarterly) 0.02 a 43.50
휂 0.50
Policy variables
휁 0.35 휏푤 0.150
푔¯ 0.20 휌푢 0.400
휌푒 0.50 휌푖푡 (year 2000) 0.550
휌푖푡 (year 2050) 0.35 휌푖푡 (year 2100) 0.325
Table 1: Parameter values
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Figure 1: Employment rates per age in 2010: EU15 data vs. model
Figure 2: Projected age-specific death rates (left), (adult) population growth and dependency
ratio (right)
Figure 3: Eigenvalues of the model with (circles) and without (squares) frictions
Figure 4: The base scenario in frictional (solid line) and perfectly competitive (dotted line)
economies
Figure 5: Employment rate across generations
Figure 6: Contributions of fertility and migration shocks to the cost of public pensions (changes
in % of GDP)
Figure 7: The consequences of eliminating early-retirement benefits after 2000, in the frictional
(solid line) and the competitive (dotted line) economy
Figure 8: The consequences of announcing in 2005 a shift to a fully-funded system in 2015, in
the frictional (solid line) and the competitive (dotted line) economy
Figure 9: Comparing the closed (solid line) and the small open economy (dotted line) scenarios
Figure 10: Consumption and savings across generations in 2000: comparing the perfect annuity
market (휛 = 1, solid line) and the imperfect annuity market (휛 = 0.8, dotted line)
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Figure 11: Saving rate across generations in 2000: comparing the perfect annuity market
(휛 = 1, solid line) and the imperfect annuity market (휛 = 0.8, dotted line)
Figure 12: Base scenario with imperfect annuities, with (solid line) and without (dotted line)
labor market frictions
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